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INTRODUCTION 
 am honored to have been asked to address Dave Frohnmayer’s 
contributions to Oregon law—and more specifically, Oregon 
administrative law. I had the privilege of working for Dave as his 
deputy attorney general in the early 1990s before he left the Department 
of Justice to become dean of the University of Oregon School of Law. 
To me, Dave was not just my boss but, over the last two-and-a-half 
decades, my mentor, colleague, and friend. I miss his counsel and 
encouragement. But I continue to draw on lessons that I learned from 
him to this day. 
Dave had a particular interest in administrative law throughout his 
career. He was intimately involved in the drafting of what is now the 
state’s administrative procedure statute. He applied it regularly as the 
head of an agency and as the state’s lawyer representing other agencies 
 
* Associate Justice, Oregon Supreme Court; Adjunct Professor of Law, Willamette 
University College of Law and Lewis & Clark Law School. Thanks to Hans Linde for 
helpful suggestions and to Lauren Eldridge and Judy Giers for research assistance. 
I
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in court. And he was a nationally recognized scholar on the subject and 
taught it many times over the course of his career. This Article reviews 
Dave’s contributions to the subject of Oregon administrative law in 
terms of those different roles that he played while in public service—
as a legislator, as a lawyer for the state agencies subject to the 
requirements of the law, and as a scholar and teacher. In each of those 
roles, Dave affected the development of the law in positive and 
enduring ways. 
I 
DAVE AS A LEGISLATOR 
Let’s begin with Dave’s work as a member of the Oregon Legislative 
Assembly. Dave served three terms in the legislature, from 1975 to 
1981, as a representative of southern Eugene. Among other things, 
Dave was a member of the Legislative Counsel Committee, which had 
oversight of administrative agency procedures, and, in that role, he had 
the opportunity to influence significantly the contents of Oregon’s 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 
To appreciate that influence requires a brief digression on the history 
of administrative procedure legislation in Oregon. In the early part of 
the twentieth century, state and federal legislation began increasingly 
to assign to administrative agencies responsibility for dealing with a 
variety of social and economic issues—issues that previously had been 
dealt with by legislatures, justices of the peace, municipal officials, and 
the courts. By the 1930s, however, critics began to complain that the 
agencies often acted with no rules of procedure and, for that matter, no 
published substantive rules. 
In 1939, the Oregon legislature responded by enacting a precursor 
to what is now Oregon’s APA.1 The new law required that every 
administrative agency order, rule, or regulation be filed with the 
secretary of state and required the secretary to publish “at regular 
intervals” a summary of each order, rule, or regulation that had been 
filed.2 In addition, the new law provided that any orders, rules, or 
regulations that had not been filed with the secretary would not be 
effective against any person who had no knowledge of them.3 Notably, 
 
1 1939 Or. Laws 927. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 928. 
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the 1939 law purported to apply to all executive branch administrative 
agencies, without exception.4 
Meanwhile, the American Bar Association (ABA) studied the 
operation of federal agencies. So did special committees appointed by 
President Franklin Roosevelt and then-Attorney General Robert 
Jackson. The end result was the enactment in 1946 of the Federal 
Administrative Procedure Act.5 The ABA also recommended a 
uniform APA for the states, which it sent to the National Conference 
on Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and which, in turn, 
ultimately produced a model state APA.6 
In Oregon, after a few false starts, a bill based on the model state 
APA was passed by the legislature in 1957.7 Introduced at the request 
of the Oregon State Bar, the 1957 legislation followed the model state 
APA in dividing the universe of administrative decisions into roughly 
two types of administrative agency actions: rulemaking and 
adjudication of contested cases. Concerning the adoption of 
administrative rules, the new law required agencies to provide notice 
and an opportunity to comment before adopting any new rule.8 It also 
required agencies to include a “concise general statement of the[] basis 
and purpose” of any adopted rule.9 Upon adoption, each agency was 
required to file a copy of the rule with the Secretary of State, who was 
then required to compile, index, and publish all rules adopted by each 
agency.10 The law provided for judicial review of the validity of 
administrative rules by way of a declaratory judgment proceeding.11 
Concerning contested cases, the 1957 legislation required agencies 
to afford a hearing after reasonable notice, as well as a written decision 
 
4 Id. at 927. 
5 For an introduction to the origins of state and federal administrative procedure acts, see 
generally ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 1.2 (1986). 
6 On the development of the model act, see generally E. Blythe Stason, The Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act, 33 IOWA L. REV. 196 (1948). 
7 1957 Or. Laws 1292. For a summary and analysis of the 1957 legislation, see generally 
Richard A. Franzke & Richard F. May, Note, The Oregon Administrative Procedure Act, 1 
WILLAMETTE L.J. 233 (1960). 
8 1957 Or. Laws 1293. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 1294–95. 
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that included findings of fact and conclusions.12 Finally, the law 
provided for judicial review of all final decisions in contested cases.13 
Interestingly, the 1957 law departed from the earlier legislation in 
its more limited scope. While the 1939 law applied to all executive 
branch agencies, the 1957 law exempted a number of the largest and 
most significant state agencies, among them the Public Utility 
Commission, the State Tax Commission, the Civil Service 
Commission, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and the State 
Industrial Accident Commission.14 It also exempted any other agency 
whose practices and procedures were required to conform to federal 
law as a condition of receipt of federal funds.15 Also of interest is the 
requirement—not found in the model state APA—that the attorney 
general publish model rules of administrative procedure for agencies to 
adopt.16 
Over the course of the next twenty years, the legislature amended 
the Oregon APA, fleshing out and refining the basic structure that had 
been enacted in 1957. In 1971, the legislature significantly increased 
the scope of the APA by eliminating many of the exemptions originally 
included in the 1957 legislation.17 In 1975, it added a requirement that 
agencies must adopt rules governing their rulemaking procedures,18 
and it established a process for oversight of administrative rules by the 
Office of Legislative Counsel and a Legislative Counsel Committee.19 
In 1977, it added a requirement that agencies must keep on file a 
“statement of [] need” during the rulemaking process.20 
In 1977, the legislature also charged the Legislative Counsel 
Committee with conducting a thorough review of the state APA over 
the course of the 1977–79 interim and proposing recommendations 
about needed changes in the law. An Interim Subcommittee on 
Administrative Procedure Act Reform was organized, with 
Representative Dave Frohnmayer as its chair.21 
 
12 Id. at 1295–97 (notice and opportunity for hearing). 
13 Id. at 1297–99. 
14 Id. at 1292. 
15 Id. at 1299. 
16 Id. at 1293. 
17 1971 Or. Laws 1773. 
18 1975 Or. Laws 2094–95. 
19 Id. at 133–34. 
20 1977 Or. Laws 97. 
21 See LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL COMM., FINAL REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT ii (1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
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Dave’s approach to the interim subcommittee’s work was pragmatic, 
side-stepping larger policy initiatives in favor of measures that would 
streamline the APA, making it more efficient without sacrificing 
accountability.22 It was work that required the interim subcommittee to 
dig into the messy details of administrative procedure. Over the 
following months, the interim subcommittee conducted hearings, 
during which it received testimony from administrative agency 
representatives and members of the interested public. During the course 
of those hearings, the interim subcommittee received a number of 
suggestions about improving the administrative process in Oregon.23 
And, in response to those suggestions, the interim subcommittee 
developed a number of proposed amendments to the APA. The 
Legislative Counsel Committee forwarded the proposed amendments 
to the 1979 legislature, and the legislature adopted nearly all of them.24 
A review of the legislative history reveals that Dave was the 
indispensable man throughout the process. As chair of the House 
Committee on Judiciary (and as a member of the conference committee 
that resolved differences resulting from amendments in the Senate), 
Dave carefully shepherded the bill from introduction to enrollment.25 
In its report to the Legislative Counsel Committee, Dave’s interim 
subcommittee modestly referred to the amendments as being primarily 
of a “technical” nature.26 The characterization, however, should not be 
understood as diminishing their important practical effects. A brief 
review of three examples will give an idea of their nature and 
significance. 
The first amendment concerned the subject of subdelegation of 
rulemaking authoritythat is, the authority of an agency head to 
delegate certain responsibilities to subordinates.27 The APA referred to 
administrative “agenc[ies],” but left uncertain whether the 
 
22 The Interim Committee, for example, declined to make any recommendations on more 
controversial policies such as whether to establish an independent hearing officer division. 
Id. passim. 
23 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at vii. 
24 See David B. Frohnmayer, The Oregon Administrative Procedure Act: An Essay on 
State Administrative Rulemaking Procedure Reform, 58 OR. L. REV. 411, 420 (1980). 
25 See generally, e.g., Oregon Administrative Procedures Act, Hearings on H.B. 2497 
Before the Conference Committee, 1979 Leg., 60th Sess. (Or. 1979); Oregon Administrative 
Procedures Act, Hearing on H.B. 2497 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 1979 
Leg., 60th Sess. (Or. 1979) [hereinafter Oregon APA Hearing]; Oregon Administrative 
Procedures Act Conference Committee Report on H.B. 2497, 60th Sess. (Or. 1979). 
26 FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at vii. 
27 1979 Or. Laws 741. 
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requirements that apply to them could be satisfied by agency personnel 
other than the agency head, board, or commission, which made holding 
an agency accountable for compliance with the APA difficult. As Dave 
later explained in an article on the 1979 amendments, in the real world, 
“an enormous number of de facto delegations of rulemaking authority 
within agencies are shifting, lacking in clarity, and almost never 
embodied in a formal writing. Identifying the agency personnel who 
are responsible for final decisions becomes a major task for citizens 
and legislators.”28 
The Oregon Supreme Court had noted just such a problem in 
Reynolds v. Children’s Services Division, in which the operator of a 
day care center challenged the Department of Human Services’ 
revocation of her certificate of operation.29 She obtained a formal 
hearing, which resulted in a final order of revocation.30 In noting that 
fact, the supreme court complained that, “[i]t is not entirely clear from 
the record who exercised the authority of the agency in making this 
order.”31 The court observed that the relevant statute delegated 
authority over certificates to the Children’s Services Division (CSD) of 
the department, while the order was signed by a hearings officer and 
the manager of the Management Systems Unit of the division.32 “The 
record does not show whether authority to make a final order was 
delegated either to the hearings officer or to the manager,” which the 
court noted could affect the validity of the order.33 
Dave’s interim subcommittee recommended addressing that 
problem by amending the APA to allow expressly for an agency to 
subdelegate rulemaking authority to subordinate officers or employees 
within an agency so long as the delegation is made in writing and filed 
with the secretary of state.34 The 1979 legislature adopted the proposed 
amendment, and the provision survives as an important part of the APA 
today.35 
 
28 Frohnmayer, supra note 24, at 426. 
29 Reynolds v. Children’s Servs. Div., 571 P.2d 505, 507 (Or. 1977) (en banc). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. n.1. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 3. 
35 OR. REV. STAT. § 183.325 (2015). For an example of a more recent case mentioning 
the significance of the issue of subdelegation, see Marshall’s Towing v. Dep’t of State 
Police, 116 P.3d 873, 875 n.5 (Or. 2005) (en banc) (“The question whether the 
Superintendent lawfully may delegate such authority has not been raised by any party, but 
the lack of statutory authority to that effect is a concern. The concern is made more palpable 
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A second of the 1979 amendments worth mentioning is the 
clarification of the “internal management directive” exception to the 
APA’s rulemaking requirements. As I mentioned, the APA required a 
series of notice, comment, and publication formalities as prerequisites 
to promulgating administrative rules. The statutory definition of the 
“rules” to which these requirements applied was sweeping, on its face 
covering practically every imaginable sort of administrative agency 
decision of any consequence.36 Excepted from rulemaking 
requirements were a subset of agency actions known as “internal 
management directives,” obscurely defined as “directives, regulations 
or statements between agencies, or their officers or their employes 
[sic], or within an agency, between its officers or between employes 
[sic], unless a hearing is required by statute, or action by agencies 
directed to other agencies or other units of government.”37 
Dave pointed out that the statutory exception expressed not one, but 
four different exceptions, and with a qualification that applies to only 
three of them.38 The courts, too, noted at the time that the term resisted 
easy understanding and application. In Burke v. Children’s Services 
Division, for example, the Oregon Court of Appeals addressed the 
validity of an action of the CSD of the Department of Human 
Resources, which terminated payments for day care services under the 
Aid to Dependent Children Program.39 The action, prompted by budget 
concerns, was accomplished by means of a simple notice to day care 
providers, with no opportunity to be heard.40 One of the providers 
challenged the validity of the notice, arguing that the agency action 
amounted to the adoption of a rule without compliance with APA 
rulemaking procedures.41 CSD responded that the notice was an 
“internal management directive” and thus exempt from any rulemaking 
requirements of the APA.42 
 
by the existence elsewhere (in ORS 183.325) of specific statutory authority for persons such 
as the Superintendent to delegate rulemaking authority.”). 
36 OR. REV. STAT. § 183.310(7) (1977) defined “rule” to mean “any agency directive, 
standard, regulation or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or 
prescribes law or policy, or describes the procedure or practice requirements of any agency.” 
37 Id. § 183.310(7)(a). 
38 Frohnmayer, supra note 24, at 433 n.100. 
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The court rejected the agency’s reliance on the exception. It began 
by noting that the term “internal management directive” is a term that 
“does not lend itself to precise definition.”43 Relying on case law 
interpreting the Federal APA and on a similar provision in the New 
York Constitution, the court ultimately clarified the exception by 
concluding that “it better serves the policy of the APA to interpret the 
phrase ‘internal management directive’ narrowly so as to encompass 
only communications . . . [that] affect individuals solely in their 
capacities as members of the agency involved rather than as members 
of the general public.”44 Because the CSD notice affected not just 
members of the agency but members of the public, the court concluded, 
the internal management directive exception did not apply, and the 
agency’s decision was subject to the rulemaking requirements of the 
APA.45 
In subsequent cases, the Oregon Court of Appeals reaffirmed and 
applied that gloss on the APA’s definition of the “internal management 
directive” exception. The court held that, “[i]f the general public who 
may have occasion to deal with the agency is more directly affected by 
agency action than the employes [sic] of the agency in carrying out 
their duties, the action must be reflected in a properly enacted rule.”46 
Dave’s interim subcommittee picked up on the court of appeals’ 
gloss on the statute and used it as the basis for revising the definition 
of “internal management directive” in the APA. Adopted by the 
legislature, the 1979 amendment clarified that the term “rule” does not 
include “internal management directives, regulations or statements 
which do not substantially affect the interests of the public.”47 
The third of the 1979 amendments that I will mention relates to an 
agency’s obligation to prepare a “statement of need” as part of its 
rulemaking process. Early versions of the Oregon APA adopted 
informal, notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements, which 
entailed publishing notice of intent to adopt a rule and providing an 
opportunity for comment.48 In International Council of Shopping 
Centers v. Oregon Environmental Quality Commission, the agency 
complied with those minimal requirements in adopting rules regulating 
 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 595. 
45 Id. 
46 Gray Panthers v. Pub. Welfare Div., 561 P.2d 674, 676 (Or. Ct. App. 1977). 
47 1979 Or. Laws 742. 
48 E.g., 1957 Or. Laws 1293. 
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certain sources of air pollution.49 The petitioners who challenged the 
validity of those rules on judicial review filed a motion with the court 
of appeals to require the agency to supplement the record on review to 
include a transcript of all hearings, all scientific evidence and other 
written materials submitted to the agency, and any staff reports.50 
According to the petitioners, administrative rules must be supported by 
a complete record establishing the factual predicates for the agency’s 
decisions.51 The court denied the motion, explaining that, in adopting 
the state APA, “it is apparent that the legislature had opted to provide 
only for informal rulemaking procedures,” which require only notice 
and an opportunity for interested persons to comment.52 
In response to the International Council of Shopping Centers 
decision, the legislature amended the APA in 1977 to require agencies 
to prepare a “statement of the need for the rule and a statement of how 
the rule is intended to meet the need,” as well as references to 
“applicable portions of the principal documents, reports or studies 
prepared by or relied upon by the agency in considering the need for 
and in preparing the rule.”53 Agencies, however, were not required to 
publish the statement of need; rather, they were permitted merely to 
make them “available for public inspection” at the agencies’ main 
offices.54 
Dave’s interim subcommittee reported “a lack of substantial 
compliance” with the statement of need requirements.55 Moreover, 
testimony from several agencies revealed instances in which no one 
asked for the statement of need, apparently because no one knew it 
existed.56 To remedy those problems, the 1979 amendments reworked 
the statement of need requirement so that it became part of an agency’s 
notice of proposed rulemaking, ensuring that interested persons are 
informed of the agency’s intentions and the bases for its proposed rules 
before any hearings.57 As Dave later said of the amendment, “the 
 
49 Int’l Council of Shopping Ctrs. v. Or. Envtl. Quality Comm’n, 556 P.2d 138, 139 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1976) (en banc). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 140. 
52 Id. 
53 1977 Or. Laws 97. 
54 Id. at 96. 
55 FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 4. 
56 Oregon APA Hearing, supra note 25, at 17 (statement of Elizabeth Stockdale, Office 
of Legislative Counsel). 
57 1979 Or. Laws 593. 
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legislature clarified precisely when in the rulemaking process the 
statement of need must be prepared. By making it part of the public 
notice contents, it ensured that the statement would be available for 
public inspection prior to any scheduled oral hearing.”58 
There were many other amendments included in the 1979 legislation 
initially proposed by Dave’s interim subcommittee—including 
streamlining legislative counsel review of proposed administrative 
rules,59 redefining a “contested case” to exclude proceedings in which 
the agency’s decision rests solely on the results of a test,60 spelling out 
the scope of judicial review of a challenged rule,61 and adding a 
requirement that the officer presiding at a contested case hearing must 
place on the record the substance of any ex parte contacts.62 All of the 
amendments reflect the sort of careful and pragmatic consideration of 
public policy and practical effects that characterized the amendments 
that I have mentioned in greater detail. 
II 
DAVE AS AN AGENCY HEAD AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Second, let’s consider Dave’s contributions to Oregon 
administrative law in his role as the head of an agency and as attorney 
general. Under Oregon law, the attorney general is the lawyer for the 
State of Oregon, its departments, agencies, boards, commissions, and 
officials. He or she heads the Oregon Department of Justice, which has 
“[f]ull charge and control of all the legal business of all departments, 
commissions and bureaus of the state, or of any office thereof” that may 
require the services of a lawyer to protect the interests of the state.63 
Moreover, the attorney general and the Department of Justice are the 
exclusive lawyers for the state,64 subject only to the attorney general’s 
authorization for an agency to hire outside counsel because he or she 
concludes it is in the public interest or because of conflicts of interest.65 
The upshot of all that was that Dave, as attorney general, found 
himself on the front line of the operation of the state’s APA. For eleven 
years, it was his job to provide advice to the administrative agencies of 
 
58 Frohnmayer, supra note 24, at 466. 
59 1979 Or. Laws 740–41. 
60 Id. at 741–42. 
61 Id. at 745–46. 
62 Id. at 746. 
63 OR. REV. STAT. § 180.220(b) (2015). 
64 Id. §§ 180.210, 180.220. 
65 Id. § 180.235(1). 
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the state about how to comply with the requirements of the state APA 
on a day-to-day basis. Dave’s work in that respect was notable in 
several ways. 
First, he tackled the job with energy and enthusiasm. He did not 
passively wait for agencies to come to him with specific issues to 
resolve. Instead—as you imagine a teacher would—he asserted all the 
power of the office he held to educate and train administrative agencies 
in advance about the requirements of the law. Recall that the original 
1957 Oregon APA included a unique requirement that the attorney 
general prepare model rules of administrative procedure.66 In the years 
following the enactment of that law, attorneys general dutifully 
published pamphlets that consisted of about fifteen pages of model 
rules of procedure, followed by a few pages of sample forms.67 Dave 
saw the obligation to supply model rules as an opportunity to teach 
agencies about their responsibilities under the law. Under his direction, 
the brief pamphlet was transformed into an Oregon Attorney General’s 
Administrative Law Manual, containing what is essentially a textbook 
on Oregon administrative law, complete with explanations of the 
history of the law and its provisions, the interpretation of relevant 
provisions by the courts, and practical checklists for agencies to use 
when trying to ensure compliance with its requirements.68 It has 
become something of a bible for every administrative agency official. 
It has also become a source for the courts in litigation about the 
interpretation of the APA.69 
 
66 1957 Or. Laws 1293. 
67 The 1971 version of The Attorney General’s Model Rules of Practice and Procedure 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, for example, consisted of a sixteen-page pamphlet 
that included twenty-nine rules with sample forms. LEE JOHNSON, STATE OF OR., THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MODEL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1971). 
68 DAVE FROHNMAYER, STATE OF OR., OREGON ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW MANUAL AND UNIFORM AND MODEL RULES OF PROCEDURE 
UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1988). This version, for example, includes 
a 172-page commentary, the model rules of procedure, the full text of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, sample forms, and a number of checklists. Id. Dave’s successors—especially 
Hardy Myers—continued that instructional focus in the publication of subsequent editions 
of the manual. The 2008 edition, for instance, now includes in excess of 223 pages of 
commentary, along with sample notices and orders, instructions on the basics of rule 
drafting, forms and rules from the secretary of state for filing administrative rules, a 
glossary, the text of the APA, and a table of cases. HARDY MYERS, STATE OF OR., OREGON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW MANUAL AND UNIFORM AND MODEL 
RULES OF PROCEDURE UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT (2008). 
69 See, e.g., Cole v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs. Branch, 87 P.3d 1120, 1133 n.22 (Or. 
2004) (citing manual); Forelaws on Bd. v. Energy Facility Siting Council, 811 P.2d 636, 
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Second, in a related vein, Dave initiated the “Public Law 
Conference,” a biennial continuing education program free to all 
agency officials, conducted by Department of Justice lawyers. The 
conference included an introduction to the APA, as well as more in-
depth classes on rulemaking procedure, the conduct of contested case 
hearings, judicial review of agency rules and of final orders in 
contested cases, statutory interpretation for administrative agency 
officials, and the like. Again, Dave approached the job not as a reactive 
lawyer, but as an enthusiastic teacher: He was eager to educate his 
agency pupils about the requirements of the law so that they could learn 
to comply on their own and without the necessity of expensive legal 
advice or, worse, litigation. I am pleased that the tradition of 
conducting the Public Law Conference continues to this day. Only last 
year, in October, the Department of Justice sponsored the latest 
conference, a two-day affair attended by so many agency officials that 
it required the Salem Convention Center to house it.70 
Third, Dave took seriously his obligation to be the exclusive source 
of legal policy for the State of Oregon and its agencies and officials. 
Throughout his tenure as Oregon’s attorney general, Dave worked to 
insulate his lawyers from the possibility of capture by their agency 
clients. In Dave’s view, Department of Justice lawyers owed their 
agency clients independent legal advice. That did not always make 
Dave popular with the state’s agencies, many of whom preferred “in-
house” lawyers who were subject to the supervision of policymakers 
and more likely to provide advice that was to the liking of their 
superiors. On more than one occasion, my duties as Oregon’s deputy 
attorney general included having an uncomfortable conversation with 
an agency head that they were not entitled to hire their own lawyers. In 
fact, in one case, Dave’s commitment to the independence of the 
attorney general as the exclusive source of state legal policy led to 
litigation. 
In Frohnmayer v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp., the issue 
squarely presented was whether the attorney general had the final say 
 
641 n.12 (Or. 1991) (en banc) (same); Gritter v. Adult & Family Servs. Div., 48 P.3d 195, 
198 (Or. Ct. App.) (“The Oregon Attorney General’s Administrative Law Manual (2001) 
supports that interpretation . . . .”), vacated as moot, 53 P.3d 469 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); 
Reforestation Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 872 P.2d 423, 426 n.7 
(Or. Ct. App. 1994) (citing manual). 
70 See generally OR. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S PUBLIC LAW 
CONFERENCE: CONFERENCE SCHEDULE (2015), http://docplayer.net/7978950-The-attorney 
-general-s-public-law-conference.html (describing the workshops available to agency 
officials during the conference). 
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over whether an agency could hire outside counsel to provide its legal 
advice.71 In 1982, Department of Justice lawyers had advised the 
governor and the legislature concerning the authority of the legislature 
to transfer funds from the State Accident Insurance Fund (SAIF) to the 
General Fund in response to a state budgetary shortfall.72 Acting on 
that advice, the legislature met in a special session and adopted 
legislation ordering the transfer of some $81 million from one fund to 
the other.73 It goes without saying that SAIF was not pleased with the 
legislation. And in response, it authorized counsel other than the 
attorney general or Department of Justice lawyers to initiate a legal 
action challenging the lawfulness of the legislature’s action.74 It further 
goes without saying that Dave was not pleased with SAIF’s decision. 
And in response, he initiated an action of his own for a declaration that 
SAIF lacked the authority to hire its own counsel without the approval 
of the attorney general.75 
The Oregon Supreme Court unanimously sided with Dave. The 
court held that SAIF, as an agency of state government, was subject to 
the provision of the law that declares the attorney general as the 
exclusive arbiter of the state’s legal policy, subject only to his or her 
own determination that it is in the public interest to have others provide 
legal services to state agencies or officials.76 
The mention of the Frohnmayer decision leads to another way that 
Dave affected the development of administrative law in this state—
namely, litigation. As the state’s attorney general, Dave and the lawyers 
at the Department of Justice were tasked with representing the state’s 
agencies in litigation involving challenges to their compliance with the 
requirements of the APA. And, indeed, the attorney general’s name 
appears on some five-dozen reported appellate decisions involving the 
interpretation and application of the state APA during Dave’s tenure. 
Several of those decisions are now regarded as landmark 
administrative law decisions, and each decision reflects the sort of 
pragmatism that we have seen in Dave’s approach to administrative law 
in his other work. In Trebesch v. Employment Division, for example, 
the Oregon Supreme Court was required to determine precisely when 
 
71 Frohnmayer v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 660 P.2d 1061, 1061 (Or. 1983). 
72 Id. at 1063. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 1064. 
75 Id. at 1064–65. 
76 Id. at 1071. 
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rulemaking is required under the Oregon APA.77 It is an unemployment 
compensation case, in which the initial decision maker, the assistant 
director of the Employment Division, denied benefits with the 
explanation that the claimant’s search for employment was not 
“systematic and sustained” within the meaning of the statute setting out 
the conditions for obtaining unemployment benefits.78 The claimant 
sought judicial review, arguing that the agency had failed to promulgate 
a rule explaining what exactly the law required when it conditioned 
benefits on a “systematic and sustained” effort to find work.79 
The claimant argued that rulemaking is required before an agency 
can apply any statutory term that entails policymaking of any sort.80 
Representing the Employment Division, Dave and his staff lawyers at 
the Department of Justice argued that the claimant’s position was not 
practicable and that, instead, whether rulemaking is required depends 
on the nature of the statutory terms involved.81 The court agreed with 
Dave that rulemaking is not always required, and that, depending on 
the case, an agency’s interpretation of statutory terms may be 
announced either by rule or by order in a contested case.82 Whether 
rulemaking is required, the court held, depends on the character of the 
terms involved, in the context of the agency structure and the allocation 
of authority within it.83 
The court followed that rule in Forelaws on Board v. Energy Facility 
Siting Council.84 In that case petitioners challenged the issuance of a 
license for storage of industrial waste sludge on the ground that, among 
other things, the agency had failed to promulgate rules interpreting 
relevant statutory provisions, relying instead on “interpretive 
rulings.”85 Dave and the Department of Justice argued that, under 
Trebesch, rulemaking was not required.86 And again, the court agreed. 
Whether rulemaking is required, the court said, depends on the 
 
77 Trebesch v. Emp’t Div., 710 P.2d 136, 137 (Or. 1985) (en banc). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 139. 
81 Id. at 138. 
82 Id. at 141. 
83 Id. at 143. The court ultimately concluded that, in that case, the assistant director of 
the Employment Division had not provided an interpretation of the term at all—either by 
rule or by order in a contested case. Id. Accordingly, it reversed and remanded the decision 
for the assistant director to do so. Id. 
84 Forelaws on Bd. v. Energy Facility Siting Council, 760 P.2d 212 (Or. 1988) (en banc). 
85 Id. at 218. 
86 Brief for Respondent at 20–21, Forelaws on Bd., 760 P.2d 212 (1988) (No. S33953). 
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“specific statutory scheme under which an agency operates and the 
nature of the rule that the agency wishes to adopt.”87 
As a final illustrative case from the Frohnmayer era, I will cite 
People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Institute of Animal Care.88 
This was another landmark decision, involving the issue of 
organizational standing under the APA.89 The University of Oregon’s 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee had approved proposed 
research on the auditory system of barn owls.90 People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (PETA) filed a petition to challenge the final 
order approving that research.91 The university committee, however, 
moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the state APA 
authorized only “aggrieved” persons to seek judicial review of such 
administrative agency orders, and PETA had failed to establish that it 
was “aggrieved.”92 PETA argued that it satisfied the statutory standing 
requirement by having zealously advocated its positions before the 
administrative agency and lost.93 Dave and the Department of Justice 
rejoined that such a conception of statutory standing is impracticable, 
as it would confer standing without reference to whether an individual 
or organization actually would be affected by the outcome of the 
case.94 
The Oregon Supreme Court sided with the university. “Although we 
have no doubt that PETA’s zeal makes it sufficiently adversarial,” the 
court observed, “zeal does not provide the requisite ‘personal stake’ in 
the outcome” that the statute required.95 
 
87 Forelaws on Bd., 760 P.2d at 214 (citing Trebesch, 710 P.2d at 138). 
88 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Institutional Animal Care, 817 P.2d 
1299 (Or. 1991). 
89 Id. at 1300. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1301. 
92 Id. 
93 Petition for Reconsideration and Review at 8, People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, 
817 P.2d 1299 (No. 88C–11844) (“[I]t is enough that the petitioner actively advocated a 
position before the decisionmaking agency and lost.”). 
94 Response to Petition for Review at 5, People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, 817 
P.2d 1299 (No. 88C–11844). 
95 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 817 P.2d at 1304–05. 
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III 
DAVE AS A SCHOLAR AND TEACHER 
The subject of administrative law was also an area of special interest 
to Dave academically. He taught the class as a young law professor in 
the years before his election to the office of attorney general and, in 
that capacity, wrote an essay on regulatory reform that won the ABA’s 
Ross Essay Award in 1980.96 At the time, calls for “regulatory reform” 
were all the rage.97 Dave did not jump on the bandwagon. But neither 
did he reject it. Instead, Davecharacteristically—called for more 
measured, pragmatic thinking about the subject. In Dave’s view, broad 
calls for regulatory reform were doomed to failure because they failed 
to reflect the messy realities of regulation, which involved different 
types of regulation aimed at different types of social ills.98 In Dave’s 
typology, three different categories of regulation were aimed at three 
different types of problems: market regulation of natural monopolies, 
regulation of environmental and other social costs of industry, and 
regulation of government itself.99 In Dave’s view, reform could be 
successful only if it identified those distinct varieties of regulation and 
addressed the distinct problems that they pose.100 Dave offered a 
variety of practical suggestions, ranging from legislative insistence on 
more carefully articulated standards to govern review of agency action 
and sunset laws to help provide milestones for legislative evaluation of 
regulatory legislation, to economic impact statements designed to 
routinize consideration of economic costs in regulatory decision-
making.101 
The same year that Dave published his award-winning essay, he also 
drafted what is probably the definitive article about Oregon’s APA, its 
 
96 David B. Frohnmayer, Regulatory Reform: A Slogan in Search of Substance, 66 
A.B.A. J. 871, 871 (1980). 
97 It was an era when, for example, Congress dramatically reduced federal regulation of 
airlines, Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978); 
interstate trucking, Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980); and 
railroads, Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980). During the 
same era, Congress more generally aimed at introducing flexibility and efficiency into 
federal regulation with the enactment of such legislation as the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 
Pub. L. No. 96–354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980); and the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96–511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980). 
98 Frohnmayer, supra note 96, at 871. 
99 Id. at 872–73. 
100 Id. at 873–74. 
101 Id. at 876. 
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genesis, amendment, and implementation.102 Modestly entitled “An 
Essay on State Administrative Rulemaking Procedure Reform,” the 
article—which, at seventy-one pages with 337 footnotes could hardly 
be called an “essay”—reviews the origins of Oregon’s APA and its 
structure, followed by a detailed subject-by-subject analysis of the 
various components of the APA, each with its own historical 
introduction and critical examination.103 It has proved an enduring 
resource—cited by other scholars104 and by appellate courts in 
Oregon105 and elsewhere106—in examining the origins and intended 
operation of various provisions of the APA. 
As Oregon’s attorney general, Dave continued to write on the topic 
of administrative law, now bringing to bear not just his formidable 
intellect but also his experience as the head of an administrative agency 
and as the lawyer for all of the state’s agencies, boards, and 
commissions. In an article published in the Willamette Law Review, he 
urged the state legislature to assume greater responsibility for 
articulating clearly its policy choices, using “plain, unequivocal, 
common sense directives for the resolution and implementation of 
those choices.”107 Using examples from his personal experience as the 
state’s attorney general—especially the Trebesch litigation—he noted 
how ambiguous expressions of legislative policy choices simply shift 
 
102 Frohnmayer, supra note 24. 
103 Id. 
104 See, e.g., William R. Anderson, The 1988 Washington Administrative Procedure 
Act—An Introduction, 64 WASH. L. REV. 781, 784 n.12, 797 n.22 (1989); Keith Aoki et al., 
Trading Spaces: Measure 37, MacPherson v. Department of Administrative Services, and 
Transferable Development Rights as a Path Out of Deadlock, 20 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 273, 
318–19 n.240 (2005); Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 
72 VA. L. REV. 297, 318 n.84, 329 n.134 (1986); F. Scott Boyd, Legislative Checks on 
Rulemaking Under Florida’s New APA, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 309, 347 n.222 (1997); 
William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 
147, 178 n.179 (1991). 
105 See, e.g., Fremont Lumber Co. v. Energy Facility Siting Council, 936 P.2d 968, 971 
(Or. 1997); Dika v. Dep’t Ins. & Fin., 817 P.2d 287, 288 (Or. 1991) (en banc). 
106 See, e.g., Woodland Private Study Grp. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 533 A.2d 387, 392–
93 (N.J. 1987); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 861 P.2d 414, 
421 (Utah 1993); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 303 N.W.2d 639, 651 n.1 (Wis. 1981) 
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
107 David Frohnmayer, Of Legislative Intent, the Perils of Legislative Abdication, and 
the Growth of Administrative and Judicial Power, 22 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 219, 221 
(1986). 
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power from the legislative to the other branches of government, in 
particular, administrative agencies.108 
In 1988, Dave was asked to address a Western States Seminar on 
State and Local Administrative Law.109 His comments identified what 
he saw as emerging trends in state administrative law. Principal among 
them, Dave noted that a generation of administrative law produced by 
courts had been superseded by one of legislation, with which the courts, 
Dave observed, have tended to insist on strict compliance.110 
In a similar vein, in 2000, Dave was asked to speak at a conference 
for the National Administrative Law Judge Foundation, at which he 
again offered his observations about the development of administrative 
law and his perceptions about emerging trends.111 Interestingly, Dave 
built on his original 1980 American Bar Association Journal article on 
regulatory reform, noting that it was striking to him how—after several 
decades of experience as a legislator, public official, teacher, and 
scholar—the concerns he identified back then still resonated with 
him.112 
Let me suggest several themes that can be found in Dave’s academic 
writing on the subject of administrative law. First, Dave emphasized 
the importance of state—as opposed to federal—administrative law. 
Dave often noted that, while the Federal APA has remained essentially 
unchanged since its enactment in 1946, state legislatures and state 
courts have been the source of continuing innovation in the area over 
the preceding decades.113 
Second, Dave urged lawyers and scholars to attend not just to 
judicial opinions on administrative procedure, but also to legislation as 
the ultimate source of law governing the administrative process. As he 
stated in his address to the Western States Conference on State and 
Local Administrative Law, “[l]awyers often give too much attention to 
case law and consequently, only passing attention to statutes.”114 Dave 
admonished that the point was of more than academic significance, for 
failure to understand that common law doctrines of administrative law 
 
108 Id. at 234–35. 
109 Dave Frohnmayer, National Trends in Court Review of Agency Action: Some 
Reflections on the Model State Administrative Procedure Act and New Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act, 3 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 1 (1989). 
110 Id. at 3–7, 19. 
111 David Frohnmayer, Administrative Law: Review of a Century, 20 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 119 passim (2000). 
112 Id. at 119–21. 
113 Frohnmayer, supra note 109, at 2 n.11. 
114 Id. at 3. 
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have given way to legislatively prescribed procedures can lead to 
“[a]ccusations of administrative law malpractice, accompanied by the 
twin perils of insurance premium increases and blemishes on 
professional reputation.”115 
Third, to Dave, history—understanding how we got where we are at 
any given point in time—was always important. No matter the 
occasion, Dave could not resist placing ideas in historical context. His 
address to the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 
began with a recapitulation of nearly the entire early history of 
administrative law, from early-twentieth century decisions such as 
Londoner v. City and County of Denver116 and Bi-Metallic Investment 
Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado,117 through Goldberg 
v. Kelly118 and Mathews v. Eldridge.119 His “essay” on the Oregon 
APA began with what he described as the “legislative history” of the 
subject generally and then included a detailed examination of the 
sources of each of the procedural requirements imposed by the Act.120 
To Dave, you could not understand a principle without understanding 
its origins. 
Fourth and finally, in all events, Dave was persistently pragmatic. It 
was never enough for Dave to recount the history of a provision or to 
expound on the possible theoretical justifications for one doctrine or 
another. Dave always, always ended with some sort of practical 
suggestion about how administrative law should work in the real world. 
Even in his most theoretical pieces—his “Regulatory Reform” article, 
for instance—Dave always ended with common-sense, real-world, 
practical suggestions.121 
CONCLUSION 
As Oregon administrative law continues to evolve in this new 
century, it is fitting that we reflect on those themes—still salient 
today—as well as Dave’s many other contributions, over a career in 
 
115 Id. 
116 Frohnmayer, supra note 98, at 121 (citing Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 
U.S. 373 (1908)). 
117 Id. (citing Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441 
(1915)). 
118 Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). 
119 Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 
120 Frohnmayer, supra note 24, at 416–20. 
121 Frohnmayer, supra note 96, at 876. 
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public service as a legislator, as the state’s lawyer, and as a scholar and 
teacher. 
